Some CNN guest expert was opining Monday that the Iraqi people crossed a psychological barrier by voting and getting a taste of free choice (setting aside the argument that they only did so under orders from their religious leaders).
I think it's possible that some of the American people will have crossed a psychological barrier as well.
I think so too. The primary impact within Iraq of the election was to transform the struggle there from a conflict between western forces and Islamic "insurgents" to one in which the Iraqi people are actively taking steps to rid their country of disruptive elements, both domestic and foreign. This is a tremendous sea change that is too little appreciated in the American media.
The impact in the US is equally profound. Until the scenes of jubilant Iraqis rejoicing in the streets hit our TV screens the dialogue over Iraq, Bush's foreign policy, and the entire question of how we fit into the post-cold war world was dominated by memories of Vietnam. One of the things I most admired about Bush was his insistence that we must move on from that haunting maisma of memory and set a new course into a new and dangerous world. It seems to me that in the past few days the nation as a whole has at last broken the psychological bonds that had been forged in Vietnam and is now ready to face hopefully the reality of a transforming world.
3 comments:
Iraqi success does not mean that Bush was right about anything. They are independent propositions, until linked by clear causal mechanisms. Post hoc, ergo propter hoc (or its political version, "it worked so we must have been right about everything") is not good policy or historical argumentation.
I think both you and Brown are underestimating what seems to me to be nearly the default position among those who opposed the under-planned initiation of the war: that Bush is right about the desirability of democracy and freedom and rights, and about extending our power and influence to expand the population of those who enjoy those endowments, but wrong about the best methods and particularly about the long-term implications of the methods chosen.
In other words, I've never read anything by an anti-war person which finds failure in Iraq to be a good thing: rather, no matter how much it hurts us in the short term, most of us would rather see Bush get undeserved credit for Iraqi success than to see Iraqi failure.
Dear Jonathan,
I think you misunderstood my post [must be clearer, must be clearer]. I was not saying that Bush was "right" about Iraq. I thought I was being specific about that.
Certainly post hoc, ergo propter hoc is not an adequate argument and being right on one thing is not the same as being right about everything. But you must admit that the failure of many of the predictions made by Bush's critics does weaken their case.
I happen to know some of the people involved with military planning over the past several decades and they are clear on one thing. This was certainly not an "underplanned" operation. That is just an election year political pose. Many of the things they planned for did not happen [rising of the "arab street", hundreds of thousands of casualties, millions of refugees, etc.] Many things were planned for and successfully met. There were surprises, to be sure, but that is inherent in any military campaign. There have been problems and failures, but they are hardly as comprehensive or as severe as political rhetoric would have it.
There are also a lot of hidden agendas and turf battles going on within government agencies that don't get into the press but shape the dialogue.
Regarding the "default position." I agree that Bush was most probably right in the desirability of expanding freedom.
The appropriateness of the "methods" used is a matter for rational dispute. As to their long-term consequences, we will have to wait and see. Historians have a very poor record with regard to predicting the future.
I have never argued that the left is hoping for failure in Iraq.
Where I agree with Brown is when he says that a psychological barrier has been crossed. The arguments against Bush's policy have all too often been rooted in memories of Vietnam. The two situations, as a simple matter of historical fact, are not really comparable. Chris Hitchens has a nice little piece on this somewhere recently, I think in Slate, but I don't have time right now to dig it out. I express hope that we have finally gotten beyond that field of reference.
I think we agree on more than we realize.
I think you're right, that we agree on more than we disagree. But I also think that we're coming at these questions from sufficiently different directions that triangulating the agreement is a challenge.
I've never had a strong position on whether Vietnam was a good analogy (Manchuria, on the other hand.... http://hnn.us/articles/5247.html), but I'm not at all sure that the voting has, in fact, solved the attitude problem you cite.
Bush's stated committment to remain in force in Iraq until it is stable and self-defensible (that's not a great word, I know, but I'm not inclined to spend time thinking of a better one) is admirable: I've argued for the same thing myself, as a matter of obligation, and his refusal to set a timetable is something that I support.
But the voting, while a triumph for the Iraqis who voted, still happened in chaos, still found millions of Iraqis sitting out for political or personal reasons, and is only the very first step on a very complicated process.
I don't think anyone has actually cataloged historians' prediction record to compare it to other social scientists. I do think that we are AS qualifed as anyone else, and if we are careful, more so. It's just that prediction is a huge job for anyone.
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