Fukuyama

No academic writer has had greater influence on American thought in recent years than Francis Fukuyama. His End of History and the Last Man was an instant classic and made him a superstar. His recent State Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century is having a major impact on policy debates in the wake of the Iraq invasion. Today's New York Times reprints an interesting article by him on the future of American-Asian relations. It's worth taking a few minutes to read, and more than a few minutes to think about it.

My response is that Fukuyama is certainly right in pointing out that America faces enormous challenges in East Asia. The old security structures forged during the Cold War are obsolete and it is not clear what will replace them. The old paternalistic relations between the US and many Asian countries are crumbling with the rise of nationalism throughout the region. There are new and rising tensions among the Asian powers that have to be addressed. But I am not so sure that his recommendations represent an adequate response to this situation.

Fukuyama is right in asserting that multilateral arrangements are sure to emerge and that the United States would be wise to facilitate them and to try to shape them rather than remaining aloof or trying to obstruct them. His proposal, though -- that the existing six-power talks dealing [or conspicuously not dealing] with the nuclear crisis in North Korea, be transformed into a continuing five-power dialogue on regional security -- does not seem to me to be much help.

Fukuyama admits that such an ongoing structure would not address major North Asian problems, such as China's relationship with Taiwan, or address broader regional problems that involve India and Southeast Asia. What is more, the current six-power talks are not going well. North Korea has been able to manipulate the situation to isolate the US rather than the reverse. If the six-power talks are going so poorly, what improvement might be expected from a continuation of them into the future? The best hope he offers is that such a forum might possibly assuage some Chinese and Korean anxieties regarding Japanese rearmament, and might prove useful in forging a common response to the collapse of the North Korean regime, assuming that such a collapse ever takes place. Both of these are rather tenuous assumptions, to say the least. Fukuyama also suggests that American enthusiasm for such a multilateral organization would help to defuse world criticism of our "unilateral" actions in Iraq. That assumes that current anti-American sentiment is primarily a reaction to our war in Iraq. I would suggest that Iraq is more the excuse for than the cause of anti-American outrage and that our efforts to forge a five-power security arrangement would count for little in the arena of world opinion.

Moreover, subordinating our policy to the decisions of a multi-lateral body could cost us a great deal. If we would abide by those decisions we would abrogate our ability to defend our not-inconsiderable interests and those of our allies in the region. Just as North Korea has successfully preempted effective American action against it and has turned the Six-power talks to its advantage; China, which has a long term goal of reducing or eliminating American influence in the region, could turn the Five-power institution into a vehicle for expanding its own influence throughout the region. What is more, exclusion of other regional states to the south could create new resentments and tensions.

Even if the new organization is not dominated by either the US or China, it would likely be ineffective in setting any coherent policy. It would suffer from the same problems as those which plague the UN Security Council where effective coordination has proven to be impossible when vital [or even superficial] interests of any of the member states conflict. As we have seen with regard to the UN the more pressing the problem, the greater the obstacles would be to effective action.

I think Professor Fukuyama recognizes the impracticality of his proposal and the fact that it is based on sheer hope. He writes that everything ultimately depends on the course of political development in China. Should China provoke a crisis over Taiwan or decide to actively pursue its hegemonic ambitions all bets are off. But if instead, China "develops into an increasingly pluralistic society in which economic interests dictate continuing good relations with its neighbors" all will be well. In response I would point out that a pluralistic society and democratic polity in no way inhibited the United States from pursuing and achieving regional hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. And, the hope that economic interests can deter conflict among nationalistic states sounds a lot like the assurances given in the decades leading up to WWI that trade and economic interdependence precluded the possibility of general conflict in Europe.

I applaud Professor Fukuyama's sentiments; there are real dangers ahead that must be faced. But I am far from convinced that his proposed solution will do much to lessen the looming problems and might easily create new ones.