Moldova Update -- the limits of reform

I have often expressed the opinion that the Orange Revolution in Ukraine was every bit as inspiring to prople around the world as the US backed elections in Iraq. In Kyrgystan, Lebanon, and elsewhere protesters have consciously modeled their efforts on those of the Ukrainians. This was the case in Moldova where protesters challenged the dominant Communist Party in recent elections. The preliminary results are in and the Communists seem to have retained control, although their margin of victory was somewhat smaller than usual.

Russia's Novostoi reports:

ELECTION IN MOLDOVA WITHOUT REVOLUTION

MOSCOW (Alexei Makarkin, deputy general director of the Center of Political Technologies, for RIA Novosti) - Much was said about the possibility of a "color" revolution, similar to events in Georgia and Ukraine, in the run-up to the parliamentary election in Moldova. But the election passed off rather calmly; none of the opposition forces attempted to take the people to the street. The political struggle will be waged using legal methods, owing to the following factors.

First, the election was "transparent," as Western observers have admitted. The West only regrets that Moldova did not lower the 6% election threshold contrary to the Council of Europe recommendations issued in 2001.

Second, all the candidates attained their minimum goals. The Communists retained the majority (46.1%), though their results were less convincing than in 2001, when they got 49.9% of the vote. However, this year's results will allow the Moldovan Communists to form the leadership of the parliament and the government. But they will need 61 votes to elect the president, which means that they will have to reach an agreement with the opposition....

And third, the Communists rallied the support of the authorities in Ukraine and Georgia....

The key to Communist victory seems to be the fact that,

President Voronin changed his policy of rapprochement with Russia for closer relations with the West. This ruled out the possibility of an exported revolution in Moldova.

Russia had tried to influence the elections by importing foreign "observers" but,

Shortly before the election, the Moldovan authorities deported 46 Belarussian and about 100 Russian citizens who had announced they would act as observers of the non-governmental CIS Elections Monitoring Organization (CIS EMO). The Moldovan authorities had not allowed official CIS observers to monitor their elections, which meant Russian representatives only attended the election as part of OSCE and PACE missions. Russian spin-doctors who worked with the opposition were deported and two of them were even arrested.

Thus the established government was able to portray itself as pro-western and anti-Russian and this seemed to sway voters. Read the full account here.

The Economist agrees. It notes:

Some in the opposition had hoped to replicate the experience of their counterparts in neighbouring Ukraine, who had converted the government’s misconduct during and after the 2004 presidential election campaign into a country-wide uprising and ultimately a change in government. Hoping to do the same in Moldova, the CDPP [anti-Communist opposition] had even changed its colours to orange in honour of the Ukrainian opposition’s campaign colours, and was planning to hold sustained public protest meetings in central Chisinau, the capital, beginning immediately after election day – once again, similar to the strategy adopted in Ukraine.

But, unlike in Ukraine, the Communist government enjoyed broad popular support. The reason?

Over the last two years in particular, the CPM [Communists] has successfully stolen much of the centre-right’s message of EU integration, co-operation with the multilaterals and economic reform.

The Economist has some doubts as to the sincerity of the Communist conversion:

In many media reports, much has been made of the CPM's European vocation – and the result has been taken, in some quarters, as a sign that Moldova is "following" Ukraine's path to the EU. This exaggerates both the extent of the CPM's European vocation and its ability to act upon it.

The CPM's switch from a pro-Russian platform – the basis of its manifesto at the previous parliamentary election – to a pro-EU stance is the result of external factors rather than any deeply held convictions on the part of its leadership (in contrast with Ukraine).

Basically, the Moldovan leadership is pissed at the Russians for not backing them in a dispute with a breakaway province. Finding no help from Moscow, they are looking for western support.

The Economist also expects trouble ahead. The failure of the Communists to get a solid majority of the delegates means that they will have to engage in protracted negotiations with the opposition prior to forming a government. These are likely to be a source of continuing turbulence. Still, the situation does mean that the opposition is in a position to wrest some meaningful concessions from the Communist leadership.

Read the article here.

The Moldovan experience shows the limits of the freedom imperative emanating from Kiev and Baghdad. In the absence of a popular leader who can unite various dissenting groups, and faced with a government willing to make at least cosmetic concessions, the protesters are unlikely to be successful. We have been treated in the MSM and in some of the political magazines to some hugely over-hyped commentary. Moldova is a reminder that the real world seldom conforms to our grandest hopes or our greatest fears.